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The scope and administration of tax benefits for religious organizations
have generated great controversy in the courts,' the legislature,' and the
academic literature.3 This Note attempts to clarify the policy rationale
underlying the religious exemption from corporate income tax and then
uses this rationale to evaluate one particular test for tax exemption under
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 501(c)(3),4 the commercial man-
ner test. The commercial manner test allows exemption only when an
organization does not exhibit commercial characteristics.5
Section I locates the commercial manner test in the existing statutory
and regulatory framework. Section II presents a theoretical framework for
the religious exemption and draws two conclusions. First, religious orga-
nizations are exempt from taxation because of the benefits they confer on
society. Second, because of potential problems of tax abuse and difficulties
in observing and measuring these benefits, exemption must be confined to
nonprofit organizations.
This analytic framework is used, in Section III, to evaluate the com-
mercial manner test. Three observations are made. The fact that a reli-
gious organization is operating in a commercial manner does not necessa-
rily indicate that it is conferring less benefit on society. In addition, the
commercial characteristics that appear in some religious organizations
may simply represent an efficient means of operation. However, some
1. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (unsuccessful establish-
ment clause challenge to exemption of church property from taxation).
2. See, e.g., Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render
Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50, 64-67 (1976) (reviewing legislative difficulties in determining
scope of church exemption from unrelated business income tax provisions).
3. E.g., Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation with Representation of
Washington, Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275 (criticizing current law as encourag-
ing dependence of religious organizations on government and government control of religion).
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989).
5. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts apply the commercial manner test in essen-
tially the same way. Because courts' refinements of the test ultimately have determined IRS practice,
this Note generally refers to court actions when describing the commercial manner test.
In the religious context, the commercial manner of operation inquiry arises most frequently in
relation to publishing companies. Zelenak, Sering Two Masters: Commercial Hues and Tax Exempt
Organizations, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 7 (1984). Religious, nonprofit, tax-exempt publishing
houses often operate in ways remarkably similar to their for-profit counterparts. See, e.g., Presbyte-
rian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070 (1981), re,'d, 743 F.2d 148 (3d
Cir. 1984) (large religious publishing house maintains § 501(c)(3) status). -
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commercial characteristics do indicate an increased probability that an or-
ganization is actually being operated to enrich insiders and so should not
be granted tax-exempt status as a nonprofit.
In light of these observations, Section IV concludes that the commercial
manner test is too broad to serve as an independent test for tax exemption.
Indeed it should be abandoned entirely by the courts. However, the IRS
should use those factors of the commercial manner test that indicate in-
creased probability that an organization is being operated to enrich insid-
ers to assist in determining when a full investigation of a religious organi-
zation's finances is necessary. Because the factors of the commercial
manner test are general characteristics of organizational operation, ob-
taining information necessary to determine whether these factors exist is
not as intrusive as a direct financial investigation. Thus, by engaging in a
two-step process where a modified commercial manner test is applied
before a full financial investigation is made, the IRS would be able to
identify religious organizations for which a full investigation is not neces-
sary, and so further the government's objective of minimal intrusion into
religious affairs.
6
I. CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURE
An organization must meet four requirements to qualify for tax exemp-
tion under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3). First, an organization must be organ-
ized and operated exclusively for one of eight exempt purposes: religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, foster-
ing amateur sports, or preventing cruelty to children or animals. Second,
the organization's net earnings must not inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual. Third, an organization must not engage in sub-
stantial political activity.7 Fourth, an organization must not engage in ac-
tivities violative of established public policy.8
This Note focuses on the first two requirements. In evaluating whether
an organization meets the first requirement-operation for exclusively ex-
empt purposes-the courts and the IRS look for, among other things, the
existence of a substantial commercial purpose evidenced by a commercial
manner of operation. If a nonprofit strongly demonstrates practices char-
acteristic of for-profit firms, courts will find that the organization is moti-
vated by a substantial commercial purpose. A finding of substantial com-
mercial purpose results in a denial of exemption, despite the existence of
an exempt purpose that is furthered by the activity conducted in a com-
mercial manner.9
6. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989).
8. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Socy v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374
(D.D.C. 1981), affd mer., 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
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The second requirement for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3), the
ban against private inurement, prohibits enrichment of those persons
closely associated with a nonprofit organization. Reasonable payment for
goods or services is not private inurement and does not disqualify an or-
ganization from receiving section 501(c)(3) status on the grounds that it
serves private interests.'0 Salaries; other cash compensation such as divi-
dends, royalties, or "debt repayment"; and in-kind compensation are eval-
uated by a reasonableness standard. Where the total of these benefits ex-
ceeds reasonable compensation for services rendered, private inurement or
purpose to enrich private individuals is inferred."
II. THE RATIONALE FOR EXEMPTING NONPROFIT RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS FROM TAXATION
A. Public Benefit
The dominant rationale for exempting an organization from taxation is
that the organization confers benefits on society as a whole.' 2 The organi-
zation's activities do not benefit only those who operate it or those to
whom it provides services. Since the benefits to the individuals purchasing
Though the literal language of § 501(c)(3) suggests that any nonexempt purpose precludes an organi-
zation from maintaining exempt status, courts have not taken a hard-line position on this issue. Some
courts hold that a substantial commercial purpose results in a denial of exemption regardless of the
extent or nature of the exempt purpose. Other courts inquire whether the commercial or exempt
purpose is primary and award tax status accordingly. For a discussion and review of cases, see Marx,
An Analysis of Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Company v. Commissioner, 30 CATH. LAW.
134, 141-43 (1986). This difference is immaterial to the analysis of this Note.
10. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
11. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
private inurement under reasonableness standard), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); Founding
Church of Scientology, 412 F.2d at 1200-02. Compensation of a controlling member of a nonprofit
based on a percentage of gross revenues may pass the reasonableness inquiry, World Family Corp. v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958 (1983), but such compensation schemes will be closely scrutinized. Cf
People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127 (1980) (exemption denied to church where
minister compensated by variable percentage of gross receipts).
12. Bob Jones Unit., 461 U.S. at 588-92; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (tax exemption and tax deductibility are subsidies administered
through tax system to organizations whose activities promote public welfare).
Commentators have proposed tax base defining rationales, as an alternative to the public benefit/
subsidy rationale, for the favorable tax treatment of nonprofits. Tax base defining rationales for tax
exemption argue that the exemption of nonprofit organizations from taxation is neither a special
privilege nor a hidden subsidy. Rather, taxation of nonprofits is inconsistent with a tax system whose
fundamental goal is to tax activities carried on to make a profit. The most notable effort is by Bittker
and Radhert who outline both the difficulties of defining the concept of taxable income and the diffi-
culties of determining an appropriate tax rate based on ability to pay for public benefit organizations
like religious nonprofits. Bittker & Radhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Fed-
eral Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); see also Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Orgamzatwns: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 67, 73-75 (Powell ed. 1987) (summarizing tax base defining rationales). But Cf
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxa-
tion, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) (criticizing tax base defining rationales and explaining federal income
tax exemption of nonprofits as a way of compensating nonprofits for difficulties of capital formation
created by prohibition against private inurement).
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and selling services do not reflect the total benefits resulting from an activ-
ity, a less than socially optimal level of the activity will occur. Hence, a
government subsidy such as tax exemption is necessary to raise the level of
an activity creating significant beneficial externalities.1 3
Congress grants section 501(c)(3) status to organizations that it believes
convey these significant beneficial externalities. The government forgoes
tax revenue to encourage production of the public benefits these organiza-
tions convey."4 The Supreme Court has held that the public benefits con-
ferred by religious organizations are a "beneficial and stabilizing influence
in community life"1" and encouragement of diversified views and perspec-
tives which contributes to a vigorous, pluralistic society."
B. Why Not Exempt Religious For-Profits?
Although the Supreme Court has adopted a subsidy rationale for tax
exemption based on the public benefits nonprofit religious organizations
convey, commentators have criticized this theory on the grounds that it
argues equally for exemption of for-profit firms that provide the same
services as nonprofits. According to these commentators, a reasonably
competitive market for services that convey substantial beneficial external-
ities would result in most of the subsidy being used to produce these ser-
vices.'" Competition would prevent the owners of for-profits from appro-
priating part or all of the subsidy in the form of higher profits.1"
13. Simon, supra note 12, at 76. Use of the word "subsidy" does not imply that nonprofit organi-
zations are the undeserving beneficiaries of government largess. Rather, a lessened tax burden (or
some other form of subsidy) is the correct economic treatment of organizations which produce public
benefits.
14. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588-92. Many activities have beneficial externalities. Food,
which is generally considered a private good which benefits the one who consumes it, also conveys
beneficial externalities on those who enjoy seeing others well fed. Classification as an organization
listed in § 501(c)(3) reflects a legislative judgment that the beneficial externalities provided by an
organization are great enough to justify subsidization. See Hansmann, supra note 12, at 66.
15. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
16. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. In less competitive markets, the revenues foregone by the Government may be used to enrich
the owners of for-profits instead of being used to increase activities with significant beneficial exter-
nalities. Thus, in less competitive markets, the subsidy of tax exemption must be confined to nonprof-
its. H. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax 20 n.37 (Aug. 1988)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
18. A subsidy would reduce the marginal cost of production. As each firm attempted to maximize
profits by setting price equal to marginal cost, the subsidy would be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices. Hansmann, supra note 12, at 67. The primary area in which religious organiza-
tions currently appear to operate in competitive markets is religious publishing. Tax exempt, reli-
gious, nonprofit publishers print religious books similar or identical to those produced by some for-
profit publishers. See supra note 5. The issue may also arise in other contexts, such as doing genea-
logical research necessary to the performance of religious ordinances. Rev. Rul. 71-580, 1971-2 C.B.
235 (organization financed by membership fees, which researches genealogical information so that
rites may be performed for dead relatives, qualifies for § 501(c)(3) status although genealogical re-
search may not ordinarily be for exempt purposes).
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1. Renaming to Gain Tax Advantages
Even if some religious organizations operate in competitive markets,
there is a powerful rationale for confining tax exemption to religious non-
profits-that is, those religious organizations that do not enrich the people
who operate them. Although it is difficult to define religion, it seems clear
that the goals of the religious exemption-encouraging activities which
have a beneficial and stabilizing influence on society and contribute to
pluralism"'-are not furthered by organizations renaming activities "reli-
gious" to increase profits to owners."0 If "religious" for-profit organiza-
tions were allowed to claim 501(c)(3) status, the IRS and the courts
would face the difficult task of determining which of these for-profit orga-
nizations were in fact religious, and which were merely calling themselves
religious to gain the subsidy of tax exemption to enrich owners. 21 The
prohibition against private inurement allows the IRS and the courts to
avoid an inquiry into religiosity or sincerity in these cases and turn in-
stead to a determination of whether an organization is nonprofit.22
The problem of renaming is substantial. Despite the prohibitions
against private inurement and private benefit, which undoubtedly deter
much renaming, the Tax Court is inundated with cases of renaming to
enrich owners. 23 These cases are not easily decided. It is practically diffi-
cult and constitutionally problematic to separate what is "sincerely reli-
gious," and hence deserving of tax exemption, from what is merely tax
motivated renaming.' Courts have found few activities which they con-
sistently view as evidence of a substantial nonexempt purpose, and hence
implicitly unreligious, resulting in a denial of section 501(c)(3) status.
19. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
20. Giving advice on how to reduce tax liability is a nonexempt purpose. National Ass'n of Am.
Churches v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 18 (1984); Ecclesiastical Order of the ISM of AM v. Commis-
sioner, 80 T.C. 833 (1983), afj'd, 740 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1984); Christian Stewardship Assistance v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037 (1978).
21. In theory all for-profits will engage in renaming resulting in entire industries being subsidized
(assuming for-profits have no motivation to abstain from calling their activities religious). In a com-
petitive market these subsidies will be passed through to purchasers resulting in no net profits to the
owners of for-profits. However, renaming will still occur as each for-profit firm seeks a competitive
advantage. In addition, actual profits may be obtained due to organizations obtaining information
about the availability of a subsidy at different times.
22. The private inurement constraint does not, however, prevent renaming to gain tax advantages
to increase an organization's output of products. In these situations the government must make the
hard decision of what is religious and what is not.
23. B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-ExFMPT ORGANIZATIONS 194-98 (1987). Avoidance of the
corporate income tax is not the only reason firms would engage in renaming. Most states grant prop-
erty tax exemption to § 501(c)(3) organizations. Simon, supra note 12, at 72. Consequently there is
an incentive for organizations not subject to the corporate income tax to attempt to qualify for
§ 501(c)(3) status as religious organizations.
24. The courts and the IRS cannot disallow an organization's tax-exempt status on the grounds
that the beliefs on which it rests are inherently unreligious, but only on the grounds that the alleged
beliefs are not sincerely held. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2146 (1989) (reli-
gious benefit standard for which money transfers qualify for charitable deduction is unworkable be-
cause tax payers' beliefs may only be questioned as to sincerity not inherent religiosity).
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The history of the Universal Life Church is illustrative. Upon first con-
sideration, the courts refused to find that the Universal Life Church's ex-
tensive practice of granting church charters, ordaining ministers, and issu-
ing Honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates through the mail for a
suggested twenty dollar free-will offering were evidences of a nonexempt
purpose. The Universal Life Church had no traditional doctrine; its mem-
bers and pastor only believed that everyone had a right to his or her own
beliefs.25 However, the court reasoned:
The fact that the plaintiff distributed ministers' credentials and
Honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates is of no moment. Such ac-
tivity may be analogized to mass conversions at a typical revival or
religious crusade. Neither this Court, nor any branch of this Govern-
ment, will consider the merits or fallacies of a religion. Nor will the
Court compare the beliefs, dogmas, and practices of a newly organ-
ized religion with those of an older, more established religion. Nor
will the Court praise or condemn a religion, however excellent or
fanatical or preposterous it may seem. Were the Court to do so it
would impinge upon the guarantees of the First Amendment.26
It was not until years later, when the IRS denied the Universal Life
Church's exemption on the narrow grounds that a substantial part of its
activities were directed at supplying tax advice, an established nonexempt
purpose, that denial of exemption was upheld. 7
2. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of the Private Inurement
Constraint
The important question in articulating a rationale for the private inure-
ment constraint is whether it solves more problems than it creates. The
private inurement restriction is not costless. It involves detailed and exten-
sive factual inquiry into every use of an organization's funds. However,
when compared with the difficulties involved in defining religion and reli-
gious activities, illustrated by the cases dealing with the Universal Life
Church, a private inurement investigation appears significantly less diffi-
cult than supporting a claim that a particular organization is not truly
religious. IRS practice reflects this judgment. Usually the IRS does not
disqualify an organization on the grounds that it is not religious where it
appears that renaming to enrich owners is occurring.28 Rather, it disqual-
25. Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
26. Id. at 776.
27. Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 567 (1987), aff d, 862 F.2d 321 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). After first seeking and failing to obtain summary judgment against the Universal Life
Church on the grounds of private inurement, the IRS successfully sought summary judgment against
the Universal Life Church on the grounds described in the text. Id. at 580.
28. See Slye, Rendering unto Caesar: Defining "Religion" for Purpose of Administering Reli-
gion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. & Pua. POL'Y 219, 250, 280 (1983).
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ifies the organization on the grounds of private inurement and private
benefit even though the facts of a case might well support a finding that
the alleged religious beliefs were not sincerely held or that the organiza-
tion was not engaging in activities furthering religious purposes. 29
In addition, though the private inurement inquiry involves an intrusive
analysis of a religious organization's financial operations, it is simpler
than evaluating an organization's activities to determine if they are reli-
gious.30 Simple criteria for defining the scope of religious exemption are
preferable in light of the importance of maintaining separation between
church and state. "As a general rule, the more complicated the basis of
classification for exemption, the greater the danger of involving the Gov-
ernment in entangling inquiries."' Entanglement of the government with
religious institutions may result in government interfering with the inde-
pendence of religious institutions, religious institutions may gain undue
access to and exercise control over the monitoring government agency, or
the potential for political divisions along religious lines may increase.32
Although the prohibition against private inurement makes administra-
tion of tax exemption less difficult and less entangling, denial of exemp-
tion to for-profit firms may unfairly treat for-profit providers of religion
or religion-related goods and services which provide beneficial externali-
ties as great as those produced by nonprofits and which are in competition
with tax-exempt nonprofits. As tax-exempt nonprofits use the subsidy of
tax exemption to decrease the industry price, the profits of these for-profit
organizations are reduced. Consequently, these for-profit religious organi-
zations bear a disproportionate share of the societal costs of tax
exemption.
However, true unfairness to for-profit firms occurs in few situations.
First, religious nonprofits control only a small proportion-less than one
percent-of the nation's economic resources. Many of these organizations
29. Id. at 270, 291-92; see, e.g., Levy Family Tribe Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 615
(1978) (exemption denied to family controlled organization which believed that each stamp traded
represented a living soul and a link to religious activity carried on by ancestors, based on finding of
private inurement); Basic Bible Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 846 (1980) (exemption denied to
organization claiming religious purpose, supported by founder and paying a substantial portion of
founder's living expenses, based on finding of private benefit), affjd sub nor., Grazow v. Commis-
sioner, 739 F.2d 265 (1984); Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531
(1980) (exemption denied to organization, formed to disseminate belief in benevolent Supreme Being,
which paid substantial monies to founder and was supported by founder, absent showing of adequate
services rendered in exchange for monies).
30. An established and coherent body of law exists to determine what constitutes private inure-
ment. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In contrast, Federal tax law lacks a coherent and
workable definition of the term "religious." B. HoPKINS, supra note 23, at 194.
31. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 458 n.53 (1984), affd, 823 F.2d
1310 (9th Cir. 1987). Some commentators see minimization of involvement between religious organi-
zations and the government as the primary justification for religion based tax exemption. E.g.,
Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201,
266 (1987).
32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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are churches whose primary activities do not meaningfully compete with
for-profit organizations. Thus only those for-profit religious organizations
that compete with a subset of a very small proportion of the economy bear
a disproportionate share of the costs of the religious tax exemption.3" Sec-
ond, the disproportionate burden on for-profit organizations in competi-
tion with religious nonprofits may be called unfair only where exit from
an industry is costly, and where nonprofit entry into an industry is un-
foreseen. If exit from an industry is not costly, then for-profit organiza-
tions whose profits are being reduced by competition with tax exempt
nonprofits can simply leave the industry and make the market rate of re-
turn in another sector of the economy. Likewise, if tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations are already involved in a particular business before a for-
profit enters the industry, or if the entry of nonprofits is foreseen, the for-
profit organization voluntarily assumes the lower rate of return caused by
the presence of nonprofits. Thus this lower rate of return is not unfair. 4
In sum, the truly unfair costs to this relatively small group of organiza-
tions appear to be outweighed by the decreased administrative costs and
the lessened government involvement in religious affairs made possible by
the private inurement constraint. 35
3. The Limits of the Argument
This rationale for non-profit tax exemption does not apply to all section
501(c)(3) organizations. The justification for the private inurement con-
straint in the religious context is that the costs of administering this stan-
dard in conjunction with a standard focusing on beneficial externalities
33. Estimates based on 1984 statistics conclude that § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) nonprofits ac-
count for only 5.6% of the national income. Religious organizations account for almost 12% of this
figure. B. HOPKINS, supra note 23, at 18-22. In addition, § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations
account for only 4.2% of total entities in the United States compared with 94% for the business sector.
Id.
34. Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1017, 1019-21, 1025 (1982).
In addition to fairness considerations there is an efficiency concern. If nonprofit religious organiza-
tions are less efficient at producing religious goods and services than are for-profit religious organiza-
tions, a net efficiency loss results from confining a production subsidy to nonprofit organizations.
Because nonprofit organizations have no owners seeking to maximize revenues, arguably they may not
be as effective at minimizing costs as are for-profit firms. Conversely, one may argue that in the
religious context the ideological motivation of firm managers will provide appropriate cost minimizing
incentives. In addition, nonprofit organizations may be able to harness resources, such as volunteer
workers, that would not be available to a for-profit firm. The relative efficiency of religious nonprofits
and for-profits is a complicated empirical question and is beyond the scope of this Note. Cf. Frech,
The Property Rights Theory of the Finn: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 143 (1976) (suggesting nonprofit insurance companies are less efficient than for-profit insur-
ance companies).
35. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
The possibility of granting tax benefits to for-profits is limited to competitive industries. See supra
note 17. Therefore, a significant additional cost to elimination of the private inurement constraint for
religious organizations in competitive markets is differentiating between more and less competitive
markets for religious services.
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are lower than the costs of administering a standard that focuses exclu-
sively on beneficial externalities. This argument rests on the premise that
determining whether an organization is religious, and so produces benefi-
cial externalities, is difficult and costly. 6 It is not clear that determining
whether non-religious section 501(c)(3) organizations produce beneficial
externalities (i.e. are truly educational, scientific, etc.) is as costly. Trea-
sury regulations define some of the exempt purposes of non-religious sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations, making identification of organizations in
these categories easier than in the religious category." This may explain
why many for-profits engaging in tax-motivated renaming attempt to
qualify for section 501(c)(3) status under the religious exemption. 8 In
addition, only the religious exemption presents the possibility of infringe-
ments on the constitutional norms against entanglement of government
and religion,"9 free religious exercise,40 and government establishment of
religion.41 It appears then, that determining whether non-religious section
501(c)(3) organizations produce beneficial externalities is significantly less
costly than this determination is in the religious context. Thus in the non-
religious context, where categorization is easier and tax abusers are more
easily recognized, a standard that focuses exclusively on beneficial exter-
nalities and does not prohibit private inurement may be appropriate.
III. EVALUATION OF THE COMMERCIAL MANNER TEST
The previous section developed a public benefit rationale for religious
exemption, emphasizing the need to prevent private inurement. This sec-
tion evaluates the commercial manner test to see how it helps identify
organizations that should not enjoy favored tax status: those organizations
36. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) to (5) (as amended in 1976) (defining what is charitable,
educational, testing for public safety, and scientific). Courts and the IRS explicitly face the issue of
deciding whether an organization qualifies for §501(c)(3) status under one of the non-religious catego-
ries. This contrasts with avoiding the determination of whether an organization is religious. See, e.g.,
National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (publications not educational
because not supported by reasoned development).
38. See Cerny & Fontenrose, Administering Exempt Organization Tax Law: Confronting Com-
mercialization, the Constitution, and Campaigns, N.Y.U. FIFTEENTH BIENNIAL CONF. ON TAX
PLANNING FOR THE CHARITABLE SECrOR §§ 1.02(3), 1.03 (1987). Another reason that the religious
exemption may be so attractive to organizations motivated by tax avoidance is the collection of tax
advantages that churches, a subcategory of religious organizations, enjoy. Id.; see infra notes 81-85
and accompanying text for church tax advantages.
39. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (tax exemption
minimizes involvement between church and state and so "tends to compliment [sic] and reinforce the
desired separation insulating each from the other"). Entanglement claims arise under the establish-
ment clause. Entanglement is listed separately here because of the prominence entanglement issues are
given in religious tax exemption cases.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (collection of Social Security taxes con-
trary to Amish belief justified upon showing of compelling governmental interest).
41. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (differential burdens placed upon religious
organizations because of their fund-raising practices must be "closely fitted" to achieve compelling
state ends).
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that do not generate substantial benefits for society as a whole, or those
organizations in which private inurement is occurring.
When applying the commercial manner test, courts and the IRS ex-
amine nonprofits for practices characteristic of for-profit firms. If enough
of these for-profit practices are strongly demonstrated, section 501(c)(3)
status is denied on the grounds that the organization in question has a
substantial commercial purpose.42 Although courts have not clearly articu-
lated the rationale underlying the commercial manner test, they seem to
implicitly hold that the policy objectives of tax exemption are not fur-
thered by exempting organizations whose activities are conducted in a
commercial manner. The Third Circuit summarized this general
approach:
[C]ourts have focused on the manner in which activities themselves
are carried on, implicitly reasoning that an end can be inferred from
the chosen means. If, for example, an organization's management
decisions replicate those of commercial enterprises, it is a fair infer-
ence that at least one purpose is commercial, and hence nonexempt.
And if this nonexempt goal is substantial, tax exempt status must be
denied.43
In the religious context, the commercial manner test is applied most
frequently to nonprofit, tax-exempt religious publishers. Often religious
publishers sell most of their publications for prices that cover their costs
and generally operate in ways similar to for-profit publishers.4" However,
the commercial manner test has also been applied to other religious orga-
nizations that advance religious purposes in unconventional ways. One ex-
ample is the Golden Rule Church Association which operated various
businesses as religious training centers for living out the "golden rule" in
daily life. 45 A recent and vigorously contested application of the commer-
cial manner test occurred in Church of Scientology of California v. Com-
missioner.46 The Tax Court revoked the Church's exemption because,
among other things, its activities, which primarily consisted of providing
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1984).
44. See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner 79 T.C. 1070 (1981)
(exemption revoked), rev'd., 743 F.2d 148 (noting no private inurement); Incorporated Trustees of
the Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981) (exemption revoked);
Christian Manner Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 661 (1979) (exemption denied); Pulpit Re-
source v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594 (1978) (exemption granted).
45. Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719 (1964) (exemption granted to reli-
gious organization operating carpentry shops, laundry, hotel, sawmill, nursery, and ranch as religious
training centers for living golden rule in daily life).
46. 83 T.C. 381 (1984), off d on other grounds, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming revo-
cation on finding of private inurement).
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one-to-one religious services for a fee, were conducted in a commercial
manner.
47
Courts and the IRS look for the following characteristics in determining
commercial purpose evidenced by commercial manner of operation: 1)
sales of goods and services; 2) profit making and accumulation of profits;
3) competition with for-profit firms; 4) extensive and successful expansion
efforts; 5) formal contractual arrangements; 6) use of paid rather than
volunteer workers; and 7) isolation and centralization of organizational
control .4 The following sections argue that factors one and five are irrele-
vant to a proper determination of whether an organization should hold
section 501(c)(3) status. The other factors, however, indicate increased
probability that private inurement is occurring in violation of the statutory
prohibition. However, since these factors do not conclusively show that
private inurement is occurring, the commercial manner test should act
merely as a screening device which triggers a more complete private in-
urement investigation.
A. Irrelevant Factors
1. Sales of Goods and Services
Courts may be critical of organizations engaging in sales in the reli-
gious context because they think that the beneficial externalities religious
organizations convey (a beneficial and stabilizing influence in society and
encouragement of pluralism) are less when goods and services are sold
than when they are paid for by donations. The consistent existence of
sales in traditional religious practice rebuts this opinion.49 Rather, sales
may at certain times be a way of distributing religious goods and services
to those who value them most and will not waste them, thus advancing the
cause of religion most effectively.
Many Jewish synagogues raise from twenty percent to all of their in-
come through annual dues charged on a per family basis for membership
in the local synagogue. For seats on High Holy Days there is often a
separate charge that varies with the number and location of seats. Typical
seat fees in 1982 ranged from $200 to $2000. Synagogues also often
charge special fees to participate in Passover services and meals. Pew
rental is another form of sales, one that has a mainstream Christian his-
tory in the United States. The payment of Mass stipends, fees fixed by the
47. The Church of Scientology teaches that to reach spiritual awareness, a person must go
through a process called "auditing," which a trained Scientologist, an "auditor," administers for a fee.
Id. at 385.
48. See cases cited supra notes 44-46.
49. See infra text accompanying note 50.
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Catholic Church for Masses said in the name of or on behalf of the payor,
also involves sale of services. 50
It is doubtful, then, that sales indicate that a religious organization is
conveying fewer benefits on society. 5' Neither is it apparent that sales in-
dicate increased probability of private enrichment. 52 Rather, sales reflect
the considered judgment of religious nonprofit managers that paying the
costs of delivering religious goods and services is more efficiently accom-
plished by sales than donations. Hence, courts have incorrectly considered
sales an indicator of when tax exemption should be denied.
2. Formal Contractual Arrangements
Contractual arrangements allow for efficient and clear allocation of re-
sources and responsibilities. Religious organizations need to engage in this
kind of allocation just as other organizations do. Detailed contractual ar-
rangements are typical of many traditional churches. The United Meth-
odist Church is regulated by The Book of Discipline,53 which in addition
to setting forth the doctrinal position of the church 5' specifically delineates
the manner in which title to real property is to be held,55 provides for
auditing and bonding of church officers,5" regulates the manner in which
offerings are to be handled, 57 provides for specific percentage allocations
50. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2150 (1989); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109
S. Ct. at 2153-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner at 18-24, Hernandez v. Commis-
sioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989) (No. 87-963). In Hernandez the Court found that fixed payments for
auditing services offered by the Church of Scientology were not deductible from the payor's income as
charitable deductions because these payments were not "gifts." The Court never suggested, however,
that the type of payments discussed in the text would make a religious organization less worthy of
§ 501(c)(3) status.
51. See also Marx, supra note 9 (arguing that tax exemption of trade or business is consistent
with Internal Revenue Code); Blair, Business Activities of Tax-Exempts and Affiliates, 33 WILLIAM
& MARY TAX CONF. 1, 8 (1987) (unrelated business income tax provisions served as basis for revers-
ing IRS's narrow view of permissible business activities of § 501(c)(3) organization).
52. Sales and donations are alternative ways to pay for services. Perhaps the most notable recent
occurrence of private inurement in a religious organization took place in an organization financed
primarily by donations. In the case of the PTL broadcasting ministry, the IRS report recommending
revocation of the organization's § 501(c)(3) status because of private inurement documented approxi-
mately $2.5 million of excessive compensation to PTL's officers during the years 1981-83. Almost all
of these funds were paid to or expended for the benefit of Jim Bakker, the principal officer of PTL,
his wife, Tammy Bakker, and their family. IRS REPORT OF EXAMINATION-EXEMPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS, HERITAGE VILLAGE CHURCH AND MISSIONARY FELLOWSHIP, INC. 9 (Oct. 25, 1985).
Hansmann's contract failure theory notes that effective monitoring of the quality of services paid for
by donations is often more difficult than monitoring the quality of services paid for by sales. This is
because the person paying for services and the person receiving services are often not the same when
the services are paid for by donations. Hansmann, supra note 12, at 69. Conceivably, this could make
private inurement more likely in organizations financed by donations because those paying for the
services would not be aware that funds were not being used to produce services.
53. THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE BOOR OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHOD-
IST CHURCH (1988).
54. Id. passim.
55. Id. at % 2501-2509.
56. Id. at 2510.
57. Id. at 269.4.
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of certain offerings to specified programs,5 and establishes a structure for
determining clergy compensation. 59 The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) is
regulated by the Book of Order, a document that clearly allocates many
temporal responsibilities and privileges of its suborganizations and
members.60
Although formal contractual arrangements are a characteristic of for-
profit operation, they indicate nothing about increased probability of pri-
vate inurement or decreased public benefit. Inclusion of this factor as part
of the commercial manner test indicates that courts have become confused
regarding the goal of their inquiry. In looking for commercial characteris-
tics in nonprofits, they have seized upon any observable characteristics of
for-profit functioning without careful attention to the theory underlying
their investigation.
B. Factors Indicating Increased Probability of Private Inurement
1. Profit Making and Accumulation of Profits
Courts and the IRS have a valid reason for looking at the existence and
accumulation of profits in determining exemption. These factors indicate
increased probability of private inurement. The more profit a nonprofit
reaps on sales furthering its religious purpose, the more funds are availa-
ble to be devoted to private ends. Likewise, as a nonprofit accumulates
cash reserves, more funds are available to divert to private ends.61 How-
ever, pricing at a profit and retaining profits often reflect a considered
judgment about how a nonprofit may best further its religious purposes.
Funds may be needed to weather financial downturns and to expand
operations. 62
58. Id. at 274.
59. Id. at 717-723.
60. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), BooK OF ORDER (1988). Examples include id. at § G-
8.0000 (defining manner in which title to property is to be held and how property is to be allocated in
event of church schism); id. at § G-10.0400 (describing minimum standards of financial procedure);
id. at § G-9.000 (overview of organizational structure and provision for review of action by next
higher governing body).
61. Cf Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374,
379 (D.D.C. 1981) (increases in salaries associated with accumulation of profits), affd mer., 672
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). Courts should treat organizations
financed by sales and those financed by donations similarly in applying this factor. As Hansmann
demonstrates, the concept of profit also applies to organizations financed by donations. Donations may
be viewed as payments for delivery of services to another and expenses as the cost of delivering a
service with the difference being profit (or loss). Hansmann, supra note 12, at 61.
62. See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148, 157-58
(3d Cir. 1984) (accumulation of profits for expansion with finding of no private inurement). Because
of the prohibition against private inurement, nonprofits may not raise capital by issuing equity stock.
Thus it is important for them to be able to raise capital by accumulating cash reserves. See
Hansmann, supra note 12.
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2. Competition with For-Profit Firms
Competition with for-profit firms does not indicate that a religious non-
profit is producing fewer beneficial externalities and so is less deserving of
the subsidy of tax exemption. Rather, it raises the question of why the
for-profits are not also being subsidized."3 However, the costs arising from
abusive claims for tax exemption justify denying exemption to for-profits
providing religious goods and services in competition with nonprofits.64
This analysis supports current legislative treatment of the business ac-
tivities of nonprofits that advance their exempt function. In 1950 Congress
enacted the unrelated business income tax (U.B.I.T.) in response to com-
plaints of competitive disadvantage by for-profits competing with tax ex-
empt organizations."5 The U.B.I.T. taxes business activities of nonprofits
not substantially related to their exempt function. However, those busi-
ness activities "substantially related" to an organization's exempt purpose
are not taxed. 6 Nonprofit activities directly accomplishing an exempt
purpose and in competition with for-profits maintain tax favored status.6"
Courts are correct, however, in considering competition with for-profits
in evaluating a religious organization's eligibility for exemption. Though
competition with for-profit firms does not indicate less need for a subsidy,
it does indicate increased probability of private inurement. Activity by for-
profits in a sector of the economy indicates that market conditions allow
profits to be made and used to enrich owners. Thus, although a nonprofit
operating in competition with for-profits may not be enriching its opera-
tors, there is clearly a potential for this to occur.
63. The rationale for subsidizing religious organizations through tax exemption, developed at the
beginning of this Note, is that they convey substantial beneficial externalities on society. Since the
vendors and purchasers of religion do not receive all the benefits resulting from religion a less than
optimal production will occur, creating the need for subsidy. See supra text accompanying notes
12-16. The judgment that a less than optimal level of religious activity will be produced by market
forces is independent of whether for-profits or nonprofits produce it.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 19-35.
65. I.R.C. §§ 502, 511-514 (1989); Marx, supra note 9, at 139 n.24 (U.B.I.T. enacted because of
unfair competition); Zelenak, supra note 5, at 17 (U.B.I.T. enacted because of congressional concern
with unfair competition); cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 34 (arguing that U.B.I.T. creates greater
difficulties than it solves).
66. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1989).
67. Zelenak, supra note 5, at 17. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which
extended application of U.B.I.T. to certain activities previously considered related to exempt purposes
and abolished special treatment of churches which had been exempt from U.B.I.T., also supports this
interpretation. "[A] business competing with taxpaying organizations should not be granted an unfair
competitive advantage by operating tax free unless the business contributes importantly to an exempt
function." H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 1645, 1695.
The scope and application of the U.B.I.T. has recently been the subject of congressional discussion.
It appears likely that the "substantially related test" will remain the basic standard for application of
the U.B.I.T. to a nonprofit's business activity. However, legislation may be enacted that defines more
specifically what types of commercial activity are considered related to an organization's exempt pur-
pose. Pickle, Draft Report Describing Recommendations on the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
Daily Tax Rep., June 24, 1988, at L-4.
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3. Extensive and Successful Expansion Efforts
Aggressive marketing of religion may be the most effective way of dis-
seminating religious beliefs. Rapid expansion may demonstrate that a reli-
gion is meeting deeply felt religious needs. Scrutiny of religious organiza-
tions on the basis of rapid expansion creates the danger of encouraging a
stagnant society where various ideas and creeds preserve a hold on a fixed
proportion of the population.68 Any factor that scrutinizes a religious or-
ganization because of its success must be accepted with caution. However,
private inurement is more likely, all else being equal, in an expanding
than in a non-expanding nonprofit because a diversion of funds to private
ends will be both more noticeable and more morally objectionable if it
occurs in a non-expanding nonprofit.
A diversion of funds to private ends in a non-expanding nonprofit will
cause service levels to fall from a previously established level. This is a
measurable decline. However, although a diversion of funds from an ex-
panding nonprofit will result in slowed expansion, this will not be as no-
ticeable as a decline in service levels because there is no existing bench-
mark from which to measure decline. Consequently, a diversion of funds
to private ends is more likely in an expanding than in a non-expanding
nonprofit.
A diversion of funds from a non-expanding nonprofit will result in tak-
ing (decreasing) services from those to whom they are already being ren-
dered. A diversion of resources from an expanding nonprofit will only
result in not rendering services to people who are not yet recipients of
these services (or not rendering more services to those already served). It
seems intuitively more objectionable to turn away someone to whom one
has been providing religious services than to not begin providing others
with these services. Recent work in the economic literature supports the
validity of this intuition by demonstrating that mere possession of some-
thing increases its value to the possessor.69 Thus more harm would be
done by cutting off one who is receiving something than by not beginning
to supply someone not yet receiving something.70 Consequently, there is a
greater moral barrier against diverting funds to private ends in a non-
expanding than in an expanding nonprofit. As a result, diversion of funds
is more likely in an expanding nonprofit.7 1
68. Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148, 158-59 (3rd Cir.
1984). This discourages rather than encourages pluralism.
69. J. Knetsch, R. Thaler & D. Kahneman, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem (Sept. 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
70. The intuition described in the text is also supported by more traditional economic concepts.
The expected value of new services to new recipients will be discounted by an uncertainty factor
(assuming risk aversion). Persons already receiving religious goods or services will be certain of the
nature of the services they are receiving and thus have a higher expected value for these services than
would new potential recipients.
71. Two kinds of harm are done when a controlling group enriches itself from nonprofit funds.
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4. Use of Paid Rather Than Volunteer Workers
Certain activities demand such a large commitment of time and re-
sources that they cannot be effectively done on a volunteer basis. How-
ever, courts have a valid reason for considering the absence of volunteer
workers in determining eligibility for tax exemption. Volunteer workers
provide a check against private inurement built into the structure of a
nonprofit organization. Volunteer workers receive no material compensa-
tion for their efforts. Their only benefit is derived from advancing an or-
ganization's religious purpose. Thus, if funds are used to enrich individu-
als rather than to advance religious purposes, volunteer workers will
protest. In contrast to paid workers, volunteer workers have no material
dependency on the nonprofit to deter this protest. Hence, their absence
results in increased probability that private inurement will occur.
5. Isolation and Centralization of Organizational Control
A small group of individuals may be just as motivated by religious pur-
poses as a large group, and control may be centralized to streamline the
decision-making process. However, when a small group of individuals as-
sumes control of an organization's resources, private inurement is more
likely than when these resources are controlled by a large group of deci-
sion makers. This is because the potential benefits to each member of a
small group from using nonprofit funds to enrich the controlling group
are greater than they are to each member of a large group. As a result,
each person in a small group has a greater incentive to circumvent the
prohibition against private inurement. 2 In addition, the smaller the con-
trolling group the smaller the chance that someone will accidentally dis-
close that private inurement is occurring. 3 Finally, the larger the group
First, the government treasury is depleted because the subsidy of tax exemption is diverted to private
ends. Second, the beneficiaries of nonprofit activity are deprived of benefits. The second kind of harm
is perceived as being greater in a non-expanding nonprofit. This makes it less likely that private
inurement will occur. Thus, although less private inurement may occur in a non-expanding nonprofit,
the aggregate harm done to beneficiaries of nonprofit activity may be the same in expanding and non-
expanding nonprofits. This is because private inurement, though occurring less in non-expanding
nonprofits, will cause more harm to the beneficiaries of nonprofit activity when it does occur.
However, the impact on the government treasury will be less severe in non-expanding nonprofits.
This is because less private inurement will occur in non-expanding nonprofits, because those enrich-
ing themselves will be aware of the greater harm done to the beneficiaries of nonprofit activity. The
existence of the first kind of harm, depletion of the government treasury, will not reduce the likelihood
of private inurement because those enriching themselves from nonprofit funds will view this depletion
as affecting an impersonal institution, not as hurting real people. Thus private inurement is more
likely in an expanding nonprofit, and so greater depletion of the government treasury results.
72. Holding resources constant, the fewer people who receive part of the resources, the more each
person will receive. If each person must incur fixed costs to receive a part of the resources, she or he is
more likely to incur the costs as the benefits increase.
73. If we assume that there is some probability that each controlling member of a nonprofit will
unintentionally disclose that the controlling group is enriching itself from nonprofit funds, the
probability of disclosure increases as the group gets larger. As probability of disclosure increases, there
is less need for government concern that private inurement will go undetected.
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that must coordinate to effect private inurement, the more likely it is that
there will be an individual with a moral level sufficiently high to withhold
cooperation and so prevent private enrichment from occurring.74
C. Conclusions about the Commercial Manner Test
The analysis of the previous pages demonstrates that the only useful
purpose the commercial manner test serves in identifying which religious
organizations should be eligible for tax exemption is to detect an increased
probability of private inurement.7 5 However, each of the five factors indi-
cating this increased probability may also merely reflect wise decisions
about how best to advance an organization's exempt purposes. In addition,
private inurement may occur when some of these factors are absent. Fur-
ther, there is already a direct statutory prohibition against private inure-
ment and the courts have developed a jurisprudence to evaluate whether
this is occurring.78
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
In light of this analysis courts should abandon the commercial manner
test entirely. By the time a religious organization's tax status is litigated in
court, the IRS will have gathered information more probative of whether
private inurement is occurring than that given by the factors of the com-
mercial manner test. 77
However, with some qualifications the five factors of the commercial
manner test that indicate increased probability of private inurement may
be incorporated into the regulatory procedure used by the IRS to develop
74. Individuals have different propensities to break laws. This may be nothing more than a reflec-
tion of disparate needs or environments, but the fact remains. The larger a controlling group is (as-
suming random distribution of individuals with high propensities to obey law), the more likely it is
that the controlling group will include an individual with a high propensity to obey law who will not
cooperate in a private inurement scheme. Thus the smaller the controlling group, the greater the
probability that this self-checking mechanism will not exist and consequently private inurement will
occur.
75. This interpretation of the commercial manner test, which is based on § 501(c)(3)'s require-
ment that an organization be operated exclusively for exempt purposes, makes the private inurement
requirement a subset of the exclusive operation requirement. This reading is supported by the Trea-
sury Regulations interpreting § 501(c)(3):
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes
specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest. Thus, to meet the requirement of this subdivision, it is necessary for an organization
to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1976); see text accompanying note 7 (enumerat-
ing purposes); see also Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531,
535 (1980) (reading private inurement and private benefit synonymously), affd, 670 F.2d 104 (9th
Cir. 1981); Slye, supra note 28, at 267 (practical effect of private inurement test is to insure that
organization serves public rather than private purpose).
76. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1631
a less intrusive monitoring structure. First, it is important to note that
these factors should not be determinative in deciding whether exemption
should be granted because they merely indicate increased probability of
private inurement, not certainty."8 Second, when it is clear that private
inurement is not occurring, inquiry into commercial manner should cease
because detecting private inurement is the sole legitimate function of the
commercial manner test. 9
With these qualifications in mind, we turn to the current way in which
the IRS monitors compliance with the private inurement constraint. The
IRS already receives detailed annual reports from most section 501(c)(3)
organizations containing information directly addressing the likelihood of
private inurement.80 For these organizations the commercial manner in-
quiry is redundant. However, because of congressional and administrative
concern about government agencies intruding into religious affairs,
"churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of
churches '' 81 and "organizations operated, supervised, or controlled by or
in connection with a church or convention or association of churches"82
are not required to file these annual reports.
When the IRS suspects that private inurement may be occurring in one
of these non-filing religious organizations, it must begin its inquiry with
little or no information about the organization's finances.8 3 However, as
78. If the commercial manner test is used as an independent test for exemption, religious nonprof-
its will be discouraged from adopting those commercial characteristics which are efficient for fear of
losing their tax exemption. See, e.g., W. Bird, Publishing and Marketing Activities of Nonprofit
Organizations: Tax Exemption and Unrelated Business Income Problems (unpublished manuscript
presented to the Twenty-Second Annual Washington Non-Profit Tax Conference (Mar. 6-7, 1986))
(advising nonprofits to avoid assuming characteristics of commercial manner test).
79. For example, in Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d
Cir. 1984), the court, after determining that no private inurement was occurring, should not have
looked for commercial purpose evidenced by a commercial manner of operation.
80. I.R.C. § 6033 (1989). Exempt organizations are required to report gross income; expenses
attributable to gross income; disbursements for exempt purposes; detailed information about assets,
liabilities, and net worth; total amount of contributions and grants; names and addresses of all persons
who contributed more than $5000; names and addresses of all officers, directors, or trustees; names
and addresses of the five employees receiving the greatest amount of annual compensation in excess of
$30,000; the total number of other employees who received annual compensation in excess of $30,000;
the names and addresses of the five independent contractors (if any) who performed personal services
of a professional nature for the organization and who received the greatest amount of compensation in
excess of $30,000 from the organization in the year; the total number of such independent contractors
receiving in excess of $30,000 for the year; and a schedule showing compensation and other payments
includable in the gross income of each individual (who is required to be named under the previous
standards) paid by the exempt organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(a) to (h) (as amended in
1985).
81. I.R.C. § 6033 (a)(2)(A)(i) (1989). Because churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conven-
tions or associations of churches are not required to file for recognition of exemption under I.R.C.
§ 508, the IRS may not even be aware that these organizations exist. Cerny & Fotenrose, supra note
38, at § 1.03.
82. Cerny & Fotenrose, supra note 38, at § 1.03 n.33. In addition, a church affiliated organiza-
tion must meet an internal support test which it fails if it offers goods and services to the general
public at prices that are not substantially below cost and normally receives more than 50% of its
support from the government or the public, or from gross receipts from sales or services. Id.
83. Unless a non-filing organization is identified by high charitable deductions on a taxpayer's
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the Supreme Court emphasized in Walz, government involvement in reli-
gion should be minimized.84 Investigation of these organizations should
therefore be minimally intrusive. Congress demonstrated its concern with
overly intrusive government supervision of religious organizations in 1984
by restricting the Secretary of the Treasury's auditing of churches to de-
termine eligibility for tax exemption.85
Both Supreme Court jurisprudence and congressional action emphasize
the importance of making government intrusion into religion as narrow in
scope and as infrequent as possible. However, the IRS needs to prevent
tax-exempt church-related organizations from being operated to enrich in-
dividuals.88 Under current law, when the IRS suspects that private inure-
ment is occurring, it begins an inquiry attempting to trace all of the sus-
pect organization's expenditures. Such inquiries reflect the intrusive
questions non-church related organizations must answer in annual
reports.8
7
The important goal of minimizing government intrusion into religious
affairs would be advanced by interposing the commercial manner test as a
preliminary inquiry to assist in determining whether a full private inure-
ment investigation is needed. Since the factors of the commercial manner
test that indicate increased probability of private inurement are broad or-
ganizational characteristics, determining whether these factors exist re-
quires a much less detailed inquiry than that needed to detect private in-
urement directly. The only information needed would be: 1) total
revenues and total expenses for past and present years; 2) cash reserves; 3)
a description of the type of religious activity in which the organization is
engaged, sufficient to identify the existence of for-profit competitors; 4)
assets and liabilities for past and present years; 5) number of paid and
number of volunteer workers; and 6) number of persons in the controlling
body of the organization. 8
When the IRS suspects that a non-filing religious organization should
not retain its tax-exempt status because private inurement is occurring, it
return, the IRS's decision to audit an organization is based on facts from taxpayer complaints, news
articles, complaints by state attorneys general and other informal sources. 4 Internal Revenue Manual
(Administration) (CCH) 7(10)75.2, at 22,411-31 (Mar. 17, 1988); Conversation with Professor John
Simon, Member of the Advisory Committee on Exempt Organizations (Nov. 14, 1988).
84. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (tax exemption for
churches "tends to compliment [sic] and reinforce the desired separation [of church from State] insu-
lating each from the other").
85. Cerny & Fotenrose, supra note 38, at § 1.03. The IRS operates under the Secretary of the
Treasury. Audits of churches may be conducted only when a high level Treasury official believes that
the organization might not deserve exemption. Notice of the concerns giving rise to the audit is re-
quired before the audit may take place. The church has a right to a conference with the IRS before
any examination of its records. Limits are imposed on the length of time that an audit may take and
the frequency with which audits may be conducted. I.R.C. § 7611 (1989).
86. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 80; see, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197
(1969) (describing IRS private inurement investigation).
88. See supra Section III(B).
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should request that the organization make available data in these six cate-
gories."' This data, based on broad organizational characteristics, should
be evaluated in light of the analysis outlined in Section 111. 90 It should be
used in conjunction with the other facts that originally drew the IRS's
attention to a particular religious organization to determine whether an
organization must be subjected to the intrusive private inurement
inquiry.91
V. CONCLUSION
The IRS and the courts have used the commercial manner test as an
independent test for tax exemption. This Note has argued that using the
commercial manner test in this way is inconsistent with a rationale for
religious exemption that is based on public benefit and that recognizes the
need to prohibit private inurement. However, the IRS should use those
factors of the commercial manner test that indicate increased probability
of private inurement to help identify which religious organizations merit
the intensive scrutiny of a full private inurement investigation. This ap-
proach would further the important goal of minimizing government in-
volvement with religion.
89. If the non-filing organization claims church status, invoking the provisions of I.R.C. § 7611,
the appropriate time to request this data is when notice of a tax inquiry (first notice) is served on the
church. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 7611(a) requires formal written notice to
an organization claiming to be a church before an inquiry into eligibility for tax exemption may be
made. I.R.C. § 7611(a) (1989); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1 (1986). If the organization falls
under the provisions of I.R.C. § 7611, this information should be used to assist in determining when a
notice of examination (second notice) should be issued. Issuance of a notice of examination precedes
the formal conference requirements of I.R.C. § 7611 and indicates that a detailed investigation of
church records is imminent. I.R.C. § 7611(b) (1989); Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1 (1986).
90. IRS compliance with this two-step investigative structure could be enforced by allowing the
monitored religious organization to appeal the IRS's request for further information (after conducting
the modified commercial manner inquiry) to a court. However, it would seem that a test attempting to
measure increased probability that an illicit activity is occurring would be best applied by agency
officials with an accumulated body of expertise. In addition, many monitored religious organizations,
especially those with nothing to hide, might find it easier to disclose the requested information than to
seek relief in court. Thus, the harm of intrusive government regulation of religion would not be
prevented.
These considerations suggest that the best approach to ensuring IRS compliance with this new
monitoring scheme would be one which prevents the IRS from making unwarranted requests for
financial disclosure. Weingast and Moran's study, linking Federal Trade Commission behavior to the
preferences of the relevant congressional oversight committees, suggests that informal congressional
controls might achieve this end. Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policmaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcON. 765 (1983); see
also J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 110-72 (2d ed. 1985) (reviewing executive
supervision of administrative action). Legislative and executive control of the IRS in such a politically
volatile area is likely.
91. An alternative proposal, consistent with the analysis of this Note, is that Congress should
change the annual reporting requirements for religious organizations. Those that are currently non-
filers could be required to file annual returns containing the six points of information outlined above.
See supra text accompanying note 88. This would allow the IRS to detect situations where there is an
increased likelihood of private inurement without the detailed reporting required of most § 501(c)(3)
organizations. See supra note 80. This solution would, however, imply greater intrusion by the gov-
ernment into religious organizations.
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